When she started her work, the overall understanding was that South American nations had not reformed their police forces throughout their transitions to democracy as a result of there was a lot else that wanted to be executed. In that model of the story, fixing the police simply hadn’t been a precedence.
But when she dug slightly deeper, she discovered that there truly was an excessive amount of public demand for higher safety and crime management, and infrequently an excessive amount of anger in communities affected by police violence. The police hadn’t been ignored: They had been protected.
The police had been politically highly effective as a result of they may selectively withdraw their companies, permitting crime and dysfunction to rise, upsetting anger at elected officers. They additionally tended to be nicely linked, in a position to foyer successfully to shield their very own pursuits. That meant battle with the police was pricey for politicians, who tended to keep away from it, leaving police departments and practices largely unaltered.
But there was a selected, troublesome to obtain set of situations that, if met, would lead to police reform, Gonzalez discovered. Briefly summarized, her formulation was this: scandal + public unity + credible political opposition = reform.
The sequence started with a scandal or disaster that led public opinion to unite a majority of individuals in favor of reform, she wrote in her book “Authoritarian Police in Democracy.” If there was additionally an actual electoral menace from political opponents calling for reform, that might be sufficient to persuade leaders to act so as to stave off their competitors.
In Argentina and Colombia, that sequence led to main reforms after high-profile police killings.
But if even a type of parts was lacking, the established order continued. In Brazil, the Carandiru bloodbath was actually a scandal, and there was a reasonably sturdy political opposition that joined within the criticism, to some extent. But public opinion about it was fragmented: citing polls on the time, Gonzalez discovered that a couple of third of Brazilians permitted of the best way that the police had dealt with the state of affairs. The second component of the sequence, convergence of public opinion, was lacking. The end result: no reform.